ABSTRACT The vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs) is one of the most promising application in the communications of smart vehicles and the smart transportation systems. However, authentication and privacy of users are still two vital issues in VANETs. It is crucial to prevent internal vehicles from broadcasting the forged messages while preserving the privacy of vehicles against the tracking attack. Moreover, in the traditional mode, the transactional data storage provides no distributed and decentralized security, so that the third party initiates the dishonest behaviors possibly. In this paper, based on blockchain technique, we propose a traceable and decentralized the Internet of Vehicle system framework for communication among smart vehicles by employing of a secure access authentication scheme between vehicles and RoadSide Units (RSUs). On the one hand, this scheme allows that vehicles employ pseudonyms for Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure (V2I) communications anonymously in the non-fully trusted environment. On the other hand, the transparency of vehicles in authentication and announcement is preformed efficiently by the blockchain technology. In addition, the transaction information is tamperresistant that provides the distributed and decentralized property for the different cloud servers. With the help of Certificate Authority (CA) and the RoadSide Units (RSUs), our proposal achieves the conditional privacy to trace the real identity of the malicious vehicle in the anonymous announcements as well. Finally, through the theoretical analysis and simulations, our scheme is able to construct a secure and decentralized system framework of VANETs with accountability and privacy preservation.
usually contain the sensitive information of users, such as geographical location, license plate numbers, and so on. However, forwarding messages anonymously cannot guarantee the authenticity of the messages. Specifically, it is difficult to prevent the distribution of forged messages from internal vehicles fairly. These false messages not only reduce transportation efficiency, but also disturb the behavior of driver to cause the accident [6] . Secondly, although the majority of researches in the VANETs focus on conditional privacy and authentication [7] [8] [9] [10] , these works are short of efficient authentication, sufficient scalability and enough distribution. In the traditional scheme, the registration, authentication and revocation of vehicles are concentrated in only one party [11] , which is prone to be attacked, like self-tempering with data, leaking vehicular information and distributing the forged information in the network. In addition, the centralized cloud server in the VANETs may cause a single point of failure in data storage. Thus, it leaks the important private information including vehicle identity and communication content, etc.
It needs a reliable communication environment to provide the solution of these issues above. Blockchain is the underlying technology of the Bitcoin [12] that is a peer to peer e-cash system. This technique is a novel decentralized ledger-based method that each node manages a copy of database from system in blockchain-based networks [13] . The blockchain is beneficial for establishing a desirable data-sharing platform in the VANETs. All the activities of participants, identity authentications and broadcasted messages will be written into the immutable and unforgeable ledger with the properties of tamper-resistance and decentralization.
A. RELATED WORKS
The open access environment created by VANETs brings great challenges in privacy and security that is unfit to be implemented in the real world [14] . Zhang et al. [15] proposed an Identity-based Batch Verification (IBV) scheme for V2I and V2V communications in VANETs, which employed a temper-proof device to protect privacy, and every device stored the system's master key to generate pseudoidentities locally. However, storing the system's master key in each vehicle may expose the system to powerful attackers and unpredictable risks. Moreover, this scheme failed in taking the scalability issue and resultant communication overhead into consideration. With increasing privacy attention in VANETs, some issues of privacy, such as anonymity, reliability and traceability have become the spots to be studied. Calandriello et al. [16] proposed a hybrid method that strengthens the framework using pseudonyms with selfcertification, which is not necessary to manage them without compromising on the robustness of the system. Tan et al. [17] proposed a certificateless authentication protocol between vehicles and roadside units to realize vehicle's identity authentication, and Vijayakumar et al. [18] designed a secure authentication and key management mechanism to enhance user's key security in VANETs. However, the implementation of these two mechanisms relies on a trusted third party in the centralized system and does not provide the distributed security. Wu et al. [19] utilized one-time authentication and group signatures to identify malicious users. However, it is inefficient to trace suspicious messages due to expensive bilinear pairing operations at the stage of tracing. Qin et al. [20] adopted secure RSUs management to achieve pseudonyms control. Unfortunately, it is unable to work efficiently in areas with RSUs that are assumed as light-hardware with a low-security level in traditional VANETs.
Blockchain is a chain structure that combines data blocks in chronological order, and a distributed data ledger shared and maintained by all nodes in a decentralized system. Taking Bitcoin as an example, the transaction process in blockchain is shown in Figure1. With the characteristic of decentralization, open autonomy, anonymous traceability and non-tampering of information, it has shown a broad application prospect and attracted lots of attention from the academic and industrial fields. Many researchers in VANETs focus on improving efficiency, guaranteeing privacy and security via blockchain technology. Yuan and Wang [21] proposed a secured and decentralized blockchain-based autonomous intelligent transportation systems. Rowan et al. [22] proposed a novel blockchainbased public key infrastructure and an inter-vehicle session key establishment protocol to secure vehicle-to-vehicle communications. Chuang et al. [23] presented a privacy preservation authentication scheme (PPAS) for communication between vehicle and infrastructure in VANETs, which achieved the vehicle and the RSU to authenticate each other and satisfied most of the security requirements. However, this scheme provides no distributed system and is used to communicate with vehicles. Peng [24] proposed an on-board network anonymous authentication protocol. Although this protocol guarantees user's anonymity and efficient authentication, it cannot trace the malicious vehicle identity. Lu et al. [25] designed a blockchain-based anonymous reputation system for VANET, and Malik et al. [26] proposed blockchainbased anonymous authentication for vehicular networks. In spite of [25] and [26] are realized that preserve users' privacy in the authentication process, none of their schemes introduce method of vehicle announcement, and only are suitable in Bitcoin without compatibility. Lu et al. [27] proposed an alternative way to overcome the limitation of pre-storing lots of anonymous certificates while preserving conditional privacy. However, the vehicle should change the VOLUME 7, 2019 anonymous certificates frequently to avert the linkability of communication data, so that it should frequently interact with RSUs which affected the efficiency of VANETs seriously. The decentralized framework proposed in this paper provides reducing CA dependency, authentication with minimal overheads, data storage scheme for vehicular announcement and preserves vehicle privacy.
B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS
In this paper, we propose a secure and anonymous authentication scheme for communication of smart vehicles. In addition, we present a distributed storage mechanism based on blockchain to prevent distribution of forged messages while simultaneously preserving the identity privacy of vehicles. Detailly, we make the following contributions:
• We propose a novel blockchain-based the Internet of Vehicle system framework, which provides a decentralized and trusted communication environment for vehicles.
• Based on the proposed system framework, we design a secure access authentication scheme between vehicles and roadside units, which reduces the dependence of the Certificate Authority, provides the accountability audit of malicious vehicles, and realizes the privacy protection of vehicles.
• We also propose a distributed cloud storage scheme combined with blockchain, which is used to store vehicle announcement transactions, reducing the storage burden of blockchain, and protecting the privacy and integrity of transaction contents.
• Finally, we conduct security analysis of our schemes and time performance simulation at the different stage.
Compared with other schemes, our scheme is practical and simple whiling ensuring security, and also has the characteristics of decentralization, conditional privacy, security authentication and trusted communication.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the preliminaries, Section III introduces the framework of our proposal, Section IV details the process of the vehicle in the registration, authentication, announcement and forward transaction, Section V implements the results, which focus on theoretical analysis and simulation and Section VI concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. BLOCKCHAIN
Blockchain is a decentralized distributed database system jointly maintained by all nodes in the blockchain network. It is composed of a series of data blocks generated based on the cryptography method, and each data block is a block in the blockchain. Blocks are linked together in an orderly fashion to form a data chain, according to the order in which they were created. The link of the block is completed through the hash value of the block header data. The block chain uses this hash value as the unique identification of all blocks, and the unique block linked can be found in the block chain through the hash value of the parent block recorded in the block header. In this way, a chain from the latest block to the first block is created by the hash value sequence of each block linked to its parent block, thus forming a link-like data structure of all blocks, as shown in figure 2 .
In paper, all roadside units are used as peer nodes to build a blockchain network, which is responsible for collective maintenance of blockchain data, and broadcast messages to vehicles along the road. The blockchain network mainly stores two kinds of data, one is vehicle identity information that contains the pseudonym, public key of vehicle and the mapping relationship between the pseudonym and the real identity. The other is the hash value of the legal vehicles announcement. The blockchain itself is not suitable for storing large amount of data, so we only store the index value of the announcements in the blockchain, so as to reduce the storage burden on the blockchain network and the difficulty of data consistency maintenance.
B. VANETs
VANETs is a special wire ad-hoc network, which provides communication service for V2V and V2I scenarios.
As an important part of Intelligent transmission system (ITS), the main goal of VANETs is to provide comprehensive services for the running state of vehicle according to different functional requirement. VANETs includes three entities: CA, RSU, Vehicle(V). CA is charge of generator of system parameters and the registration of V. RSU is installed on both sides of the road, mainly responsible for vehicle authentication and communication services. The vehicle configured the On-Board Unit (OBU) can communicate with other entities wirelessly. 
C. ASSUMPTIONS
In this paper, we employ the following assumptions to design the framework of the proposal:
• The CA has enough storage space to maintain the dataset containing the relationship between the vehicle' pseudonym and its real identity.
• The RSUs has stronger computing power than generalpurpose computers to authenticate vehicles and confirm the consistence of transactions.
• Only it is beyond the adversaries' capability to compromise more than 50% participates in blockchain network.
• The cloud servers are unfamiliar to each other and have sufficient storage capacity as well. In these four assumptions, Assumption 1) is the basic requirement for conditional anonymity of vehicles, and only CA has authority to trace malicious vehicles for evidence collection in case of disputes. Assumption 2) ensures RSU to be a node that deals with data authentication and transmission, which maintains operation of blockchain network, and eliminates the limitations on computing power. Assumption 3) is the prerequisite to ensure that the blockchain itself is secure, and Assumption 4) guarantees that the cloud servers have capacity to manage data in V2V and V2I communication.
III. THE FRAMEWORK OF PROPOSED SYSTEM
We propose a blockchain-based authentication system with preserving-privacy in VANETs, where vehicles use pseudonyms issued by CA to communicate with other entities. This system establishes a trust communication environment against internal forged messages while preserving the identity privacy of vehicles simultaneously. Meanwhile, with the participation of blockchain technique, the decentralized framework is trustful and secure, and reduces the dependence on CA in the traditional schemes. The overview of the framework is shown in Figure 3 , and the detail of each component is also described.
A. CERTIFICATE AUTHORITY(CA)
CA is responsible to issue the certificate for registered vehicles and calculates two special hash functions, which are used to prepare to authenticate vehicles and trace malicious vehicles under the supervision of RSUs.
B. ROADSIDE UNIT(RSU)
All the broadcasted messages and transactions are verified by RSUs, and then be recorded in the blockchain. As the peer nodes of the blockchain network, RSUs are also responsible for authentication of vehicle identity that stored in each vehicle through V2I communication. Additionally, in order to guarantee CA trustable, RSUs maintain the relationship between vehicle' pseudonym and real identity in blockchain.
C. CLOUD SERVER
There are two main functions of the cloud server. The first is that manages the vehicle pseudonyms issued by CA for the convenience of identity verification, while the other is that stores the details of the transactions announced by vehicles that contains traffic information in a decentralized way.
D. VEHICLE
The privacy-preserving authentication scheme is running based on the blockchain. According to the unique hash recorded in the blockchain, vehicles can monitor RSUs by checking the transactions content stored in cloud server. Moreover, vehicles are able to report malicious participants to RSUs for evidence collection, and then the malicious vehicles will be punished under the cooperation of the CA and RSUs.
E. TRANSACTION
The transaction in this paper includes the transaction of vehicle identity and transaction of traffic announcement. The hash value of the latter is stored in blockchain, and the specific information of traffic condition is stored in the distributed cloud servers. Every transaction contains the timestamp and the signature of initiator, while there is no information linkable to the real identity in the transaction for privacy preservation.
F. CERTIFICATE
When register in system with real identity, the vehicles obtain certificate issued by CA that includes pseudonyms, a pair of public-private keys and two hash values. However, in this certificate, there is no real identity so that the vehicle's privacy is preserved.
IV. OUR STRUCTURE OF SYSTEM FRAMEWORK
In this section, we detail structure about our proposal, it contains the five stages: system initialization, vehicle registration, vehicle authentication, vehicle announcement, and forwarding of message. The notions used in this paper are listed in TABLE 1.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
We propose a blockchain-based privacy protection mechanism for communications of smart vehicles. The mechanism is composed of four participants, including the Certificate Authority (CA), Vehicles V = {V 1 , V 2 , . . . , V i , . . . , V n }, Roadside Units R = {R 1 , R 2 , . . . , R i , . . . , R m } and Cloud Server S = {S 1 , S 2 , .., S i , . . . , S q }. The blockchain network among all RSU is located on the highway, which stores the certificates of vehicles and hash value of communication information among vehicles. In the initialization, different participants prepare to be occupied with numerous domain parameters required for later security operations. We assume that CA builds the system for Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) based PKI and five secure hash functions are H 0 ,H 1 ,H 2 ,H 3 ,H 4 . These parameters with publicly hashing functions are stored in the vehicles publicly during the registration. In our system, it assumes that the CA to generate a public-private key pair in ECC scheme for each registered vehicle. In addition, RSUs are supplied with the vehicle's public key issued by CA for signature verification in the Ledger.
The blockchain network among RSUs provides a venue for vehicle's identity authentication and transaction verification among vehicles (e.g. traffic accident notice.), which they verify each other while storing and retrieving transactions.
B. REGISTRATION OF THE VEHICLE
In this phase, the CA as a trusted third party generates a series of system parameters according to the unique ID provided by the registered vehicle in Figure 4 . In order to preserve the identity privacy of vehicle information and communication, the CA issues a pseudonym to the registered vehicle for the communication, which has a unique mapping relationship with the real ID of the vehicle and is stored in the database of the CA. Specially, the CA also outputs the hash values to the registration vehicles and the cloud servers respectively so as to facilitate authentication of vehicles and reduce the communication burden on CA. The integrated registration procedure, as shown in and a pair of Public-Private keys from the CA, and stores these in the On-Board Unit (OBU).
Compared with the traditional model, the CA in our scheme designs two hash functions. H 0 obtains vehicle pseudonym and public key P ki , which is stored in cloud sever. H 1 that represents the mapping relationship of vehicle real identity with pseudonym is stored in OBU, and only the registration authority and the registered vehicle know the real identity of the vehicle. Moreover, the mapping of actual identity with the assigned PID i is also stored in a hash map in CA's database. This ensures easy lookup in case of traceability and accountability of malicious vehicles. Further, in order to reduce the dependence on CA and prevent malicious activity of CA, H 1 will also be recorded on blockchain at the stage of vehicle authentication, so that both CA and vehicles cannot be repudiated.
C. IDENTITY AUTHENTICATION AND REVOCATION
In the proposal, the RSUs as peer nodes build the blockchain network. As the vehicle is active on the road, it authenticates with RSU in Figure 5 .
When the vehicle comes in the range of first RSU on the road, it sends an authentication request with its own PID to the RSU. In addition to calculating the corresponding result of the request, the RSU obtains the trueness of the result by querying on the cloud server. Finally, RSU records the authentication result on the blockchain. During authentication, the vehicle communicates with the RSU by using its own pseudonym, and neither the RSU nor the cloud server learns to acquire the vehicle's real identity. As is shown in TABLE 3, the authentication process is divided into seven steps: step 1 The vehicle launches an authentication request by sending a message that obtains pseudonym PID i and public key P ki to nearby RSU. step 2 After receiving the request, RSU calculates the hash value according to H 0 algorithm and deserves corresponding result. For verifying the legality of the vehicle, the RSU queries the trueness of the result with the assistance of the cloud server. If the query result is consistent with the calculation result, the cloud server returns TURE to the RSU, which represents the vehicle is legal. Otherwise, authentication is failed. step 3 After determining the authenticity of the vehicle identity, the RUS initiates the random integer negotiation process, which sends a random integer N R i encrypted by the vehicle's public key P ki to the vehicle. and stores it in the blockchain network where all RSUs are able to get transaction Tx 1 . As a result, the RSUs have public key and certificate of the authenticated vehicle without having to authenticate it repeatedly. For the cloud server, it is responsible for storing the specific information of the transaction in the blockchain. Additionally, the cloud server also stores some parameter information (such as H 0 ) issued by the CA for the vehicle after being registered. It is worth noting that the information is not stored centrally on a certain server, but it is divided into multiple parts and stored randomly in different servers. When the OBU or RSU needs to query or verify the transaction information, the corresponding transaction content can be obtained from multiple servers according to the unique hash value of the transaction. The content of transactions is obtained through multiple servers, which can resist privacy disclosure, guarantee transaction integrity, exclude collusion attacks, and enhance the authentication and trust level of cloud storage.
D. ANNOUNCEMENT OF VEHICLE
When the vehicle is driving on the road, it may encounter sudden traffic conditions in front, such as traffic accidents, congestion and complicated road conditions. Under normal circumstances, this article regards these traffic conditions as the event D, which represents the textual description, photo or videos of the traffic conditions token by vehicles. The specific information about the traffic conditions is not discussed here. The scenario of vehicular announcement is indicated in Figure 6 .
The vehicle uses its own pseudonym for various activities to protect identity privacy. There is a traffic occurring, 5 The details of the transaction Tx 2 are divided into multiple parts (t <= q), which are stored in different cloud servers. step 6 After hashing the Tx 2 about event D, the RSU stores H 4 (Tx 2 ) in blockchain and broadcasts this transaction to all peer nodes. In this scheme, the introduction of random number realizes the temper-proof mechanism of the traffic event D, which ensures the integrity of the traffic event D. Meanwhile, vehicle's pseudonym protects its own privacy and provides an opportunity for the RSU to search for the corresponding random number. Obviously, it can be known that the transaction has added the timestamp of the traffic event D on the basis of the verified message, indicating the occurrence time of the traffic event D.
All the transactions about traffic event D are hashed in the chronological Merkle tree (CMT) and only the root hash is included in the blockchain. It is worth noting that the details of the transaction are divided into multiple parts stored in different cloud servers in a distributed way in Figure 7 . It is accessible to all nodes via a homologous transaction hash that is stored in blockchain. The corresponding hash value will also be changed if the transaction content is modified by partial cloud servers. In this case, the entity cannot gain the transaction information on the cloud servers according to the hash in the blockchain. The distributed storage mechanism of transaction details can resist the joint attack between cloud severs, and it protects the privacy of the vehicle and integrity of traffic information in the transaction.
E. FORWARD OF ANNOUNCEMENT
First vehicle that announces the traffic event D to RSUs in blockchain is responsible for trueness of the event, and other vehicles active on the road are able to verify this when they obtain the content of transaction about the traffic condition from cloud severs according to the unique hash value stored in the blockchain. The others receive the notification issued by the RSU that the transaction hash related to the traffic information, they can send a request to the cloud servers to query the transaction details via the hash. Therefore, vehicles along the road can efficiently learn the road condition information to help them take timely measures. Moreover, after the authenticity of the transaction about event D is confirmed, the vehicle can choose whether to forward the transaction or not. If so, the vehicle needs to append its own pseudonym and signature on the transaction to spread it.
However, if there is a problem with the validity of the transaction, such as the traffic condition is secure but the transaction says there is a traffic accident, etc., other vehicles can report the vehicle announcing the transaction. Then, the RSU requests real identity of the malicious vehicle from CA according to the hash H 1 in registration. Finally, with the help of CA, RSU broadcasts malicious vehicle into blockchain.
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS A. SECURITY ANALYSIS 1) PRIVACY-PRESERVING
Vehicle A uses its own pseudonym PID i issued by CA for V2V and V2I communications without any information about its real identity. For trade-off between security and privacy, pairs of identities and pseudonyms are stored with highsecurity level in CA. It means that only CA knows the real identity of any issued pseudonym for each vehicle so that only CA has the authority to track the malicious vehicle when it performs misbehaviors or broadcasts forged messages. Moreover, the mapping of real identity and pseudonym is also recorded on blockchain at the stage of authentication, and RSUs cannot learn the mapping specific information, which improves confidence level of CA effectively. In order to preserve the privacy of vehicles, no information linkable to the real identity is included in the transaction.
2) TRANSACTION TAMPERING RESISTANCE
In proposed mechanism, the transactions recorded on Blockchain have already got the agreements from all RSUs and blockchain maintains interactive consistency of RSUs. A hash-chain is used to guarantee the order and information of blocks. These hash values are unique for each block. Modifying any content of any block will cause a change to the hash values of the other blocks. Depending on the properties of hash function, if an adversary or the malicious RSU begins a perfect tampering, she/he not only needs to modify the content of the block but also modify and recalculate the hash values of all blocks after the modified block. Therefore, if there are hundreds of blocks regardless of workload while the consensus adopted in the blockchain composed of all RSUs is proof of work. As long as the malicious node does not exceed the half of all RSUs, the transaction information cannot be modified, and the longer the block chain is, the better security will be.
3) PREVENTION OF REPLAY ATTACK
Each transaction has a unique identifier txid. Therefore, transactions with the same identifier will be rejected by the consensus RSUs. In addition, the transaction with an incorrect negotiated random number is rejected in the phases of verification, and thus replay attacks are prevented.
4) DISTRIBUTED STORAGE OF DATA
The content of each transaction is divided into multiple parts stored in the different cloud servers in a distributed way, VOLUME 7, 2019 and the unique hash of the transaction is recorded on blockchain, it becomes accessible to all nodes via a homologous transaction hash that stored in blockchain. Therefore, each server has different parts of the transaction, and users can easily get the transaction information from the cloud servers according to its hash value. Compared with the traditional cloud storage, the proposed storage scheme does not have the centralized server and the right of each cloud server is equal. For each server, only a small part of the content of each transaction is known, which protects the privacy of the transaction. If adversary initiates an attack on the cloud servers, he/she has to attack each server that stores the corresponding transaction. Moreover, the distribution of the servers is random, while the cost consumed by the adversary is far greater than the value of the transaction, so that it enables to resist the joint attack between the servers.
5) TRACEABILITY
Vehicle A uses its private key to generate a signature for each broadcasted message, while RSU can use vehicle A's public key to verify the signature. Meanwhile, the other vehicles that forward the message contained the traffic condition must append its own pseudonym and signature on the message before spread it. When the malicious vehicle with forged message is found, the system will trace the malicious users and get the real identity of the malicious vehicle with assistance of the CA and RSUs. As a trusted institution, it is impossible for CA to tamper with the relevance of the malicious vehicle' real identity and pseudonym, because the mapping of vehicle' pseudonym and real identity is recorded on the blockchain. Simultaneously, a report is sent to the cloud servers to clear the identity information of the malicious vehicle while pursuing the responsibility of the malicious vehicles.
B. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, there are some significant features to be discussed, which affects the flexibility and practicability of this scheme in VANETs. Additionally, we evaluate the performance of the parts of proposal.
It makes a comparison on the supported features between our work and other related schemes [23]- [27] in terms of privacy, decentralization, multi-storage, accountability, compatibility. We use the symbol ''-'' to represent that the corresponding property is not considered. As shown in broadcast malicious vehicle into blockchain 19: end procedure vehicles in the authentication process, but did not provide distributed security, nor could it realize the accountability of malicious vehicles. References [25] and [26] proposed a blockchain-based vehicle anonymous authentication mechanism, but none of them introduced the distributed storage method of vehicle announcement, and it was only suitable for the bitcoin without compatibility. Reference [27] achieved the conditional privacy protection for vehicle authentication, but there is no feature of the distributed storage, and the efficiency of the Internet of vehicles will be seriously affected due to the frequent interaction between vehicles and roadside units. It can be concluded that only our scheme satisfies all of the properties above.
We discuss the required communication rounds for the successful authentication in RSU side, where totally n vehicles get involved. In our design, for each vehicle, only 3 rounds are required for message sending and receiving. Hence, with the additional 1 broadcast, the total communication rounds for each RSU is 3n + 1 in our design. Accordingly, the comparison result on communication cost is given in TABLE 6, indicating that our scheme requires less communication.
We implement the scheme in Golang environment using a laptop 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 and 8GB 2133MHz LPDDR3. Each vehicle is equipped with a computer to receive or send data with RSUs or CA through V2I communication for the anonymous authentications. We measure the time cost for each part of the proposal to present performance of this scheme. All results are shown in Figure 8, 9, 10 .
In our scheme, we use the elliptic Curves recommended by NIST [28] in our signature phase. Then we simulate the registration, authentication and announcement of vehicles respectively to analyze efficiency of system we proposed. The number of vehicles range from 1-50 and the average values over an interval of every 5 vehicles is gathered. As shown in Figure 8 , when a vehicle registered with CA, there are mainly two hash functions to be calculated, the average registration time for a vehicle is about 0.01ms. Moreover, there are mainly three hash operations during the vehicle declaration period, and approximate announcement time cost per vehicle is 0.023ms in Figure 9 . However, it is worth noting that the different forms of event D affects the efficiency of the vehicle announcement. Hence, we carry out simulation of event D in accordance with 256 bits data. Figure 10 . shows the authentication efficiency between vehicles and RSUs. In the reference [18] , its scheme requires five encryption operations, four decryption operations, one signature and verification operation using the asymmetric algorithm. The scheme in the reference [17] requires two encryption operations and two decryption operations using the symmetric algorithm, whose certificateless-based authentication scheme mainly uses 2n+1 bilinear pairing operations and n exponential operations, where the pairing exponential calculation leads to higher computation cost. In our scheme, there is no pairing operation, mainly involves only one ECC encryption-decryption operation and one signature operation with verification. The results of simulation demonstrated that our proposal is a more efficient authentication protocol in VANETs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based access authentication system in VANET environment. The system not only provides a trust communication environment for smart vehicles, but also preserves anonymity without revealing the real identity of users. Moreover, our proposal reduces the dependence on the authority center and burden of vehicle identity authentication in terms of efficiency. In order to prevent the distribution of forged messages from internal vehicles, we also design a secure and distributed blockchain-based transaction storage scheme, which can efficiently protect transaction information from adversary attacks while tracing the malicious vehicles. Finally, we analyze the security and validity of the proposed system and evaluate the performance of this access authentication system.
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